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PROBLEM AREA
The  focus  of  this  project  will  be  the  Lisbon Treaty,  which  entered  into  force  in  2009,  and 
expanded the EU’s security and defence policy through a sharpening of its  capabilities.  The 
Lisbon Treaty introduced Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) innovations, and we are 
interested in looking into how the Lisbon Treaty influenced the way that EU apply its force in 
foreign  and  security  policy.  We  are  therefore  looking  into  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  and  its 
provisions/innovations.  As Robert Dover argues, the Lisbon Treaty is viewed to be an attempt to 
deliver security and defence provisions to develop EU’s involvement in security related issues.
Christopher Hill, in 1993, presented the notion of the ‘capabilities-expectation gap’ that implied 
that the EU in the 1990s did not fulfil the desired expectations of an international actor, because 
of lack of capabilities, creating a gap.  The question here is, whether the gap still exists and to 
what extent. The Lisbon Treaty was partly introduced to resolve this problem by extending the 
capabilities  of  the  EU.  As  the  European  Peacebuilding  Liaison  Office  from 2012  states,  in 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU acquired legal personality reinforcing its foreign 
political  identity.  This  has  allowed  the  EU  to  “[...]  speak  with  one  voice  in  international  
organisations”,  and has  also allowed an  unprecedented voice  as  speaker  in  the UN General 
Assembly (EPLO, 2012:2).
The constituting of a High Representative along with the Petersberg Tasks and further allowing 
the Union to correct the foreign policy of its member states has allowed the Lisbon Treaty to 
address the identity problems the EU has had in the past on representation and diplomacy - As 
Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, asked: “Who do I call when I want to call  
Europe?”  (Reuters,  2009).  We  argue  that  the  Lisbon  Treaty  is  partly  a  result  of  a  gradual 
militarisation, and the outcome of the EU’s sharpened focus on security and defence, reflected in 
the 2003 European Security Strategy report. This reflects EU’s ambition for actorness on a global 
stage, and invites for a discussion on whether the Lisbon Treaty strengthened EU’s capabilities 
within its foreign policy.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
How has the Lisbon Treaty changed the way the EU is able to apply force?
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METHODS
Reading guide
To answer the problem formulation we will utilise leading authors on the field to analyse both 
what they themselves are saying, but also what the EU official documents are mentioning on the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
In the methods chapter we will describe our analytical framework using categorisation and how 
this will concretise our conclusion. Furthermore, we will in this chapter include a conceptual 
chapter in the end of the methods chapter to avoid ambiguity during the analytical part.
We will include a theoretical chapter that will describe our different academical authors and what 
their arguments are, as well as our first hand sources, and how all of these are utilized in our 
analysis to answer our problem formulation.
Relevance
Even though the Lisbon Treaty is essentially an internal treaty in that it does not directly change 
any external strategies or alliances, it does however change the way the EU does foreign policy 
by intrinsically changing the command structure of the CSDP. Coupled with a higher degree of 
allowance for use of military power, this above-mentioned change, could dominate the way the 
EU apply its power in crisis management, and further qualifies the question of whether the EU is 
capable of being a global actor. This last part is relevant in relation to whether the EU will be a  
global actor in an international system that is still changing to adapt to the end of the Cold War  
and the decreasing global power of the US. 
Our problem formulation seeks to examine how the Lisbon Treaty changed the way the EU’s 
ability to apply force. We are therefore building the problem formulation on the assumption that 
the Lisbon Treaty did change EU’s ability to apply force, implied by asking ‘how’. This invites 
for a discussion on the notion that the Lisbon Treaty did bring a change. We have therefore based 
our assumption on authors mentioned and utilised in the literature review, which our foundation 
is grounded on: how we perceive the EU. The assumption is build upon other authors, and we are 
therefore asking ‘how’ rather than ‘if’ the Lisbon Treaty brought fundamental changes after its 
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implementation in 2009. When implying the question ‘how’, we already assume that the Lisbon 
Treaty did change EU’s ability to apply force. This stems from the idea that we are interested in 
going beyond the crucial question ‘if’ the Lisbon Treaty did change, onto the question on how 
the treaty has influenced the EU.
Methodology
In the following section a reasoning for the kind of materials used, will be given along with an 
account of how we have utilised the different categories of materials, furthermore these will be 
explained.
The project will use the conclusions and some of the concepts of the authors, in essence using the 
lead  perceptions  of  the  area  to  analyse  the  Lisbon  Treaty  as  a  case  of  how  the  EU  has 
strengthened its military capabilities, emphasising on its civilian capabilities, and again use these 
authors  to  determine  how the  Lisbon Treaty has  increased  the  capabilities  of  the  EU.  It  is 
relevant  here,  to  note  that  the  critics  describe  this  move  more  as  a  capability  swap,  where 
normative power is traded for military capabilities as stated by Michelle Pace. 
Materials
The materials used for this project is divided into two categories primary and secondary sources. 
The  primary sources  consist  of  empirical  or  semi-empirical  sources,  whereas  the  secondary 
sources consist of theories from scientific authors and textbooks along with course-textbooks, 
functioning as our primary sources. 
Primary Sources
The primary sources used in the project consist of articles from the EU official webpage along 
with other articles published by journalists. Lastly we included an article from Reuters in this 
category.  These  sources  have  been  put  into  this  category  because  of  a  potential  bias.  This 
however, does allow us to quote i.e. the EU webpage or declarations of other actors and analyse 
on  this  for  the  benefit  of  the  analysis.  For  instance,  how  we  quote  the  differences  in  the 
Petersberg  tasks  as  described by the  EEAS and how this  has  allowed us  to  analyse  on  the 
difference the Lisbon Treaty made in the Petersberg Tasks - how this has empowered the EU in 
its foreign policy objectives. 
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Secondary Sources
The secondary sources are the theoretically useful material,  used in this project consisting of 
works written by academic authors, academic articles, textbooks and course-textbooks. These 
sources are placed in this category because of their academic content. Most of the sources are 
peer-reviewed, and can be used directly as theoretical application. This means that the academic 
bias of these sources is slight enough that these can be used as a theoretical framework, allowing 
us to ground our analysis in the theories of authors on the area. We have tried to balance some of 
these sources by adding a few critiques among the authors, which will allow us to broaden the 
reflective part of the project.
Categorisation
To simplify and structure the analysis  we have divided the different sources into categories: 
power,  Lisbon  Treaty,  peacekeeping  and  global  actor.  Some  sources  cover  two  categories 
however these are the general steps. This has created an overview allowing us to sort arguments 
into categories, that may be comparable in their more basic context. The inspiration for these 
categories comes from points made by our secondary sources, as we determined that this would 
facilitate a comprehensive answer to our problem formulation. The order of the four categories 
has allowed us to demonstrate a progression in our core arguments, which has allowed us to 
present  our  analysis  and  conclusion  in  the  order  we  felt  would  reflect  best  the  change  in 
application of force stated in our problem formulation.
The category of “power” has been added because the different authors on power discuss if the 
Lisbon Treaty has changed the way that the EU is able to apply force and how these see a 
militarisation in this process. Furthermore, the authors although they differ in their conceptions, 
provide a basic theoretical construct for answering our problem formulation.
The category of the “Lisbon Treaty” includes changes made by the Treaty and how these might 
be intended to expand the role of the EU as a global actor which also binds the last category into 
the  analysis.  The  category  of  “Peacekeeping”  is  intended  to  examine  if  there  along  with  a 
possible  change  in  the  use  of  force  presented  by  the  Treaty,  is  also  a  planned  change  in 
operational category and if this could show a new direction for EU foreign affairs. The category 
of “Global actor” has been chosen to inspect if the Treaty supports or even achieve the long held 
aim of the EU to become a global actor, or if the Treaty will make little or no difference either  
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because the EU is  already a Global  actor  or  if  the EU cannot  without  even more extensive 
institutional changes, become one.
Conceptual framework
The developed problem formulation captures key concepts that we aim at  explaining in this 
following section. The predominant concepts that we have used in this project, have framed our 
approach by the notion ‘application of force’ that we define by the use of military and civilian 
power.  Normative  power,  using  the  concept  of  Manners,  is  the  capability  to  define  what  is  
normal by example and thus not directly applied force. The concept of military power describes 
how an actor, using its military institutions, can promote a furthering of its aims. This is similar 
to civil power, however civil power would in most conceptions as presented in the literature 
review be seen as all applicable uses of force that is non-military, however it can like military 
power not be completely separated from normative power.
The  concept  of  peacekeeping  is  the  prevention  and/or  intervention  in  a  conflict  seen  as  an 
application of  force  intended to lessen or  preventing violence.  This  peacekeeping should  be 
separated from peacebuilding that is the kind of post-conflict resolution of a conflict and further 
a step towards long term conflict prevention. We acknowledge that the EU does both, however as 
there is no guarantee for success in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and since the latter is a very 
long-term action, we limit ourselves to focus on the EU’s peacekeeping activities, since the time 
scope since the Lisbon Treaty has not allowed for a good sample of peacebuilding operations. 
The use of  global  actorness  stems from the perception  that  to  be an effective  player  in  the 
international system, one has to be able to affect the system. This can both be seen in a regional 
and a global setting, seen in whether such an actor is able to apply its influence effectively in the 
whole of the international system or only limited regions. The notion of security in regards to 
EU’s foreign policy can help us to understand the EU’s influence, on the international system, 
viewing EU as a security actor. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Power
In this following section, the notion of normative power Europe, will be defined and examined 
by Michelle  Pace and Ian  Manners,  who both seek  to  discuss  EU’s  normative,  civilian  and 
military power measured by its capabilities.
 
Michelle  Pace  seeks  to  examine  Normative  Power  Europe  (NPEU).  In  her  article  The 
Construction of EU Normative Power’ from 2007 she argues that the construction of normative 
power in the European Union has had a disempowered effect in terms of reducing its political 
role as a global actor (Pace, 2007). She invites for a discussion on whether military actions and 
active foreign policy or ‘militarisation’ reduces EU’s normative power. As Pace presents, the 
NPEU is understood as “[...]institutional articulations of the principles EU actors uphold which  
include rule of law, good governance, democracy, human rights, order and justice” (Nicolïdis 
and Howse, 2002; Manners, 2006; Smith, 2005; Pace, 2007: 1045). These are, as Ian Manners 
also argues, the core principles, values and norms of the EU, which has been developed on the 
basis of the European Union through declarations, treaties, and policies. According to Michelle 
Pace, an international community creates an environment in which constructions of NPEU can 
be developed. It is this construction that guarantees EU the international legitimacy. The NPEU 
is  viewed  in  a  conflict  setting,  where  she  addresses  how  the  NPEU  is  constructed:  “The 
construction of the EU as a normative power enables EU actors to create a broad range of  
measures aiming at – on the one hand – eliminating socio-economic inequalities and – on the  
other hand – building up political and social institutions and capacities” (Pace, 2007:1051).  She 
argues that dialogue plays a crucial role for the EU as it represents a key pillar of the NPEU 
construction, thus implying diplomatic means in conflict situations. EU actors have, according to 
Pace, EU foreign policy instruments, which takes a twofold stand: First, a bilateral contractual 
relation that presents the normative power constructions and legitimacy, and second, EU actors 
seeks to implement policy initiatives in the areas of human rights, border security, immigration 
among others (Pace; Young, 2002; Smith et al., 2006: 2007).
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Ian Manners, stresses upon the notion that EU’s power has become more military, from which he 
argues that EU’s institutional role has changed that he seeks to examine. In accordance to the role 
of EU in international relations - in terms of its civilian power,  François Duchêne,  in 1970s 
defined  civilian  power  as  a  “[…]  long  on  economic  power  and  relatively  short  on  armed  
force”(Manners,  2002:  236).  Manners  furthermore,  build  his  definition of  civilian power on 
Twitchett and Maull’s definitions, which he interpret as “[...] centrality of economic power to  
achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems;  
and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational  institutions to achieve international  
progress” (Twitchett, 1976, 1-2;Maull, 1990, 92-3; Manners, 2002: 237). Manners argues that in 
1999  EU  underwent  a  fundamental  shift  from civilian  power  to  military  power  due  to  the 
development of a common foreign and security policy was expected to include defence policy. 
The  expectation  of  EU  to  strengthen  its  military  power  resulted  in  disappointment  that 
Christopher  Hill  calls  ’capabilities-expectation gap’ (Manners,  2002).  Here,  Christopher  Hill, 
argues that the European Community in the 1970s, was not an effective international actor, in 
terms of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events. 
Hill argues that the capability-expectation gap emerged for two main reasons; firstly, because 
there is a “[...]lack of actorness, which is being ignored, second, a full actorness and coherent  
system is demanded and far from realisation” (Hill, 1993: 318). Hill’s argue that defence and 
actorness are two separate categories, but depends on each other. Essentially, the EC is not able 
to  develop  and  build  an  effective  military  capacity  without  the  achievement  of  ‘general 
actorness’ (ibid.).  
In terms of military power, Michael O’Hanlon stresses on the importance of strengthening the 
international community’s capability to react in conflict situations.  O’Hanlon’s methodology for 
measuring projectable military capabilities rests on three main elements: strategic lift, logistics 
assets  that  allow units  to  operate  in  severe  foreign  regions,  and legally  deployable  military 
personnel (O’Hanlon in Crocker et al. 2013: 324). He therefore underline that what determines a 
country’s  capacity  is  the  strategic  lift,  deployable  logistics,  and deployable  troops,  which  is 
embedded  in  the  notion  that  forces  has  to  be  available  for  rapid  deployment  (O’Hanlon  in 
Crocker et al. 2013). Here, he present as ‘rough rule of thumb’, which implies that as a standard,  
the forces must be deployable within two to three months (ibid.). 
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The EU is an example of demonstrating these criteria. The Union made attempts to deploy and 
strengthen  its  military  capabilities  –  following  the  Headline  Goal  aims  for  rapid  force 
deployment  aiming at  increasing  the  number  of  troops  to  60.000,  according O’Hanlon.  The 
international community should, according to O’Hanlon, deploy a larger amount of troops to 
manage the world’s conflicts. 
According to Manners, the military power Europe is ‘visible’ through the common European 
security and defence policy (ESDP) agreed on at the Cologne European Council, which meant 
that EU was committed to a “[...] 60,000-person rapid reaction force” (Manner, 2002: 237). The 
militarization of the EU – as Zielonka, argues may weaken the “EU’s ‘distinct profile’ of having  
a civilian international identity” (Manners; Zielonka, 1998, 2002:237). For Manners, discussing 
EU’s  civilian  and  military  power  is  a  question  of  its  capabilities.  Here,  he  highlights  the 
importance of looking into EU’s ability to shape conceptions  of ‘normal’ in an international 
relation setting.  A table  illustrates that  civilian power,  depends on the ability to  use civilian 
instruments; military power depends on the ability to use military instruments, where normative 
power highly depends on its  ability to shape conceptions  of ‘normal’ (Manners,  2002:  240). 
According  to  Manners,  the  constitutional  norms determine  its  international  identity  –  hence 
functioning as crucial components in constituting EU’s identity. 
Actorness
In this section, we examine the “actorness” of the European Union on the world stage. That is to 
say, enhance theoretical approaches, which explain whether the European Union is capable of 
calling itself a global actor. Defining the EU, as a global actor is a matter of possessing the 
military and civilian capabilities, thus referring to the linkage between global status and global 
responsibilities, as Bretherton and Vogler, Dacian Duna and Habegger, Yannis and Price states.
Dacian Duna views EU’s ‘actorness’ in an international relation setting, within the area of global 
security.  He goes by the constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty to demonstrate that the 
Common Foreign  and  Security  Policy  signalled  a  move  towards  a  military-oriented  foreign 
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policy to balance the NATO, and US’s military power, which has strengthened EU’s capability to 
become a global security actor (Duna, 2010).
On  the  contrary  Robert  Dover  in  his  article  The  European  Union’s  Foreign,  Security  and 
Defence Policies,  affirms that  EU has  been a  problematic  foreign  and security policy actor, 
because of its inability to formulate a “[…] cohesive identity of credible capabilities” (Dover in 
Cini and Borragán, 2013:240). Capabilities, following of Hill are, “cohesiveness, resources, and 
operational  capacity”  (Hill,  1993:  321).  Moreover,  Dover  argues  because  an  international 
organisation such as NATO has been positioning itself in the foreign and security policy sphere, 
it makes it more difficult for the Union to establish itself as a foreign policy organ (Dover in Cini 
and Borragán, 2013).  One of the reasons is  that the European Union’s common foreign and 
security policy, which was confirmed by The Treaty of European Union, still lacks the potential 
to become a supranational foreign policy. Here, the absence of a functioning foreign policy rests 
on  the  idea  that  EU  remains  a  ‘civilian  power’  (ibid.).  There  has  been  a  process  of 
Europeanization of foreign, security, and defence policies, on the contrary member governments 
pursue independent foreign policies, and some seeking to undermine the EU as a foreign policy 
actor.
 
As for the authors Yannis A. Stivachtis, Chris Price and Mike Habegger view the EU as a peace 
actor. In their article  EU as a Peace Actor,  they argue that the development of the European 
Defence and Foreign Policy has strengthened the EU’s status as being an international political 
player,  expecting  the  Union  to  act  in  response  to  international  crisis  emerging  worldwide 
(Habegger et al. 2013). The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, remarked 
a change in EU’s status as acting as an international political player, according to Habegger et al. 
As the authors mentions, the EU is committed to uphold and develop international law and work 
within  the  framework of  the  UN charter,  where  the  UN Security  Council  hold  the  primary 
responsibility for maintaining the international peace and security. The civilian forms of power, 
have become a crucial role in effectively stabilise international peace and stability in security 
terms.
 
In the book, European Union as a Global Actor, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, argue that 
the EU is in a process of developing an understanding of its role as a global actor, arguing that 
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the behavioural definition of a global actor is:  “[...]  an entity that is capable of formulating  
purposes  and  making  decisions  and  thus  engaging  in  some  form  of  purposive  action”  
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:17). The behaviour is crucial, since the behavioural definition of an 
actor represents an entity that is able and capable of formulating purposes, and making decisions 
leading towards purposive actions. The Union’s external activity emphasise a crucial interaction 
between presence, opportunity and capability. The presence means that EU holds the ability to 
influence beyond its border; it shows and demonstrates its presence, while capability refers to the 
internal context of EU’s external actions (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The presence indicates 
the ability to influence on an external level, meaning “[...] to shape perceptions, expectations  
and behaviour of others” (ibid.: 27). According to Christopher Hill the actorness depends on the 
autonomy, meaning that EU is able to establish its own laws and acquiring actor capabilities 
(Hill, 1993).  In order to measure the Community’s capabilities, it is necessary to look into how 
the Union performs in the international system, according to Hill. There are certain factors that 
implicates  the  functions  of  the  EC  in  the  International  System:  ‘the  stabilising  of  western 
Europe’, ‘managing world trade’, ‘principal voice of the developed world in relations with the 
south’ (ibid.: 310). The EC and its Member States became an important source of aid in the 
developed world, providing a second western voice in international diplomacy: The EPC has 
evolved as a response to create an alternative of European diplomacy (ibid.). 
ANALYSIS
In this part we will analyse our four categories and end each part with a sub conclusion to enable  
a more comprehensible and cohesive conclusion.
Power
In this part a short summary of the three different sources placed under the category “power” 
written by Ian Manners, Michelle Pace and a joint essay by Stivachtis, Price and Habegger will  
be given. This summary will examine what the five authors perceive as the EU’s three different 
perspectives on power. The analysis of power is utilised to reflect on the different perspectives 
on power to ease the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty as well as enable a comparison with the  
concept of global actorness and the EU’s actorness. 
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According  to  Ian  Manners  the  way  EU  does  and  always  will  do  foreign  policy  through 
Normative power (Manners, 2008). This power distinguishes itself from classic forms of power 
by passively or actively changing what is normal in international politics. This, Manners states, 
happens  within  the  UN  system,  and  has  changed  the  way  we  look  at  principles  like; 
“[...]sustainable  peace,  freedom,  democracy,  human  rights,  rule  of  law,  equality,  social  
solidarity, sustainable development and good governance” (Manners, 2002: 2). Michelle Pace to 
some extend acknowledges Manners concept of normative power, however Pace argues that by 
working normatively the  EU inhibits  itself  from lasting  conflict  resolution.  She  furthermore 
points out several flaws in the EU’s conduction of normative foreign policy in the case of Israel  
and  Palestine,  where  EU  according  to  her,  took  several  seemingly  contradictory  steps  by 
awarding a democratic election with economic sanctions because of the Palestinians electing the 
in EU eyes wrong government. According to Pace this reaction contradicted and thus decreased 
the normative image of the EU (Pace, 2007).
Yannis A. Stivachtis, Chris Price and Mike Habegger argue that the EU uses both civilian and 
military power to apply its normative power with the aim of securing international peace and 
security. Their approach therefore differ from Manners in that they argue “[...] there appears to  
be a clear progression in the order in which they are put into practice” (Habegger et al., 2013: 
14). This means that they understand normative power as something that can be both civil and 
military power, whereas Manners states that these three powers are things apart. The civilian 
power these three authors utilise, is build on François Duchene’s (1973) work and a definition by 
Hans Maull (1990) of a civilian actor as an actor  “[...] whose conception of its foreign policy  
role and behavior is bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence  
and instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international relations .” (Habegger et  
al.,  2013:10).  This  conception  sees  civil  power  as  a  way  to  make  diplomacy  through  the 
international community ultimately aiming to better a state itself, but also for the bettering of 
other states and the community as a whole. This comes close to the form of power Ian Manners 
describes as  normative power,  meaning that  the way the article  views civil  power might  be 
incompatible  with  how  Manners  view  civil  power  (Habegger  et  al.,  2013).  This  last 
incompatibility might not be the case however; Manners’ core political concepts of consensual 
democracy, supranational rule of law and good governance could from the perspective of both 
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Manners and Stivachtis,  Price and Habegger be seen as civil  power.  However,  the argument 
Manners proposes is that the way the EU conducts its foreign policy promoting civil power by 
example, ultimately promotes civil power as the “normal power” making the two powers fully 
compatible. This fits with Pace’s argument that the increase in military power decreases the EU’s 
normative power. This means that when the EU uses military power the EU acts contradictory to 
the depiction of “normal” that EU projects through its normative politics. It is important to note 
in this last argument of contradictory powers that as the EU has not yet used this military power 
aggressively. 
It can be argued from the above-mentioned analysis, that there is a power-struggle on how EU is 
being perceived. Following Manners’ argument EU is and will always be a normative power in 
spite of the shift from civilian to military power. On the contrary, Michelle Pace argues that this 
militarisation will challenge EU’s normative power, meaning that an increase in military power 
is a decrease in EU’s normative power. In accordance to how the EU applies its force, Habegger 
et al.,  argue that the EU exercises both civilian and military power in the employment of its 
‘normative power’. 
The Lisbon Treaty  
As Tom Clonan states, “The mention within the Lisbon Treaty of the ‘progressive framing of a  
common defence policy that might lead to a common defence’ is not new” (Clonan, 2008:2). As 
stated in the article  EU’s Military Ambitions Clear: Lisbon Treaty Analysis,  by Clonan – the 
framework of a foreign and defence cooperation is the result of a process, which existed already 
before the Lisbon Treaty.  However,  one could argue that the Lisbon Treaty is  a step for the 
European integration,  particularly regarding the foreign policy,  which gives  more power and 
capabilities to the EU for its peacemaking actions. 
 
In fact, the Lisbon Treaty was in the Common Security and Defence Policy area a continuation 
of the idea posed by the failed Constitutional Treaty, however the basic ideas of a united foreign 
policy of Europe goes back to the very beginning of the EU, with the project of a European 
Defence Community in 1954 which included military unit but it did not succeed (Urwin in Cini 
and Borragan, 2013). 
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The first weighty integration in this area was with the creation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy by the Maastricht in 1992. The one of the objectives of the Union is to "assert its  
identity  on  the  international  scene,  in  particular  through  the  implementation  of  a  common  
foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which  
might in time lead to a common defence" (Europa; Summaries of EU legislation, CFSP, 2014).
 
Then, in 1998 the United Kingdom and France negotiated the matters of the EU’s defence policy, 
which resulted in a Saint Malo Declaration, which stated that EU needed to be in a position “[...]  
to play its full role on the international stage” (Bindi, 2010: 36). This means that EU needs to be 
able to use its military forces to respond to international crises, especially in a context of the 
Yugoslavian  conflict.  Thus,  it  paved  the  political  path  for  EU  governments  to  launch  the 
European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 
1999 (Grevi et al., 2009). It was intended “to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities  
to assume its responsibilities regarding a common ESDP” (Clonan, 2008:2). Later, the European 
Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ from 2003, was enforced to strengthen the 
cooperation between the European countries. 
 
According to Bretherton and Vogler, “[...]the lack of military instruments to support the policy  
aims  of  the  Union,  even  before  the  humiliating  events  of  the  Balkans  war  of  the  1990s,  
contributed  to  pressure  for  the  development  of  an  EU  defence  dimension”  (Bretherton  and 
Vogler, 2006 : 190). From this, it can be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon seeks to strengthen the 
role  of  the  European  Union  at  an  international  level  by  expanding  its  foreign  policy’s 
capabilities, especially in the area of military power usage. The reforms introduced the aim to 
make the CFSP, “[...]more coherent, to increase its visibility and as a result, to strengthen the  
EU’s role as a global actor” (EPLO, 2012:1) . According to Dover, The Lisbon Treaty aimed to 
further develop the EU’s involvement in security issues, particularly those relating to terrorism, 
arguing  that  if  members  of  the  EU are  subjected  to  a  terrorist  attack  or  natural  disaster,  a 
common defence will be applied (Dover in Cini and Borragán, 2013).
This may reflect a tendency in the international community to consider military power more 
effective than civil power, and thus the treaty could move the EU away from the previously 
peacekeeping course.  In  connection to  this,  the Treaty of Lisbon introduces particularly two 
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major innovations. On the one hand, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy who ensures the consistency of the EU’s external action, along with the 
Council  and  the  Commission  (ibid.).  Moreover,  the  High  Representative  is  assisted  by  the 
European External Action Service,  the ‘diplomatic corps of the EU’. On the other hand, the 
second innovation aims at establishing a common European defence with the development of the 
Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP).  The  CSDP  establishes  a  framework  for 
cooperation, meaning that the EU launches operational peacekeeping missions and strengthening 
international security in third countries (Summaries of EU legislation, CSDP, 2014). 
The Petersberg Tasks, which was introduced in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, defined the 
EU’s  military  action  in  crisis  management  operations  under  the  framework  of  the  CSDP, 
involving “[...]  peacekeeping tasks,  tasks  of  combat  forces  in  crisis  management,  including  
‘peacemaking’, and humanitarian and rescue tasks” (The Petersberg Tasks, 2014). In regards to 
this, Robert Dover argues that  “[...]  the emphasis on Petersberg-style military reinforces the  
EU’s self-constructed soft security identity... [which] is a product of the EU’s inability to deal  
with  peacekeeping  and  peace-enforcement  operations  such  as  those  presented  by  the  
Yugoslavian civil war” (Dover in Cini and Borragán, 2013: 247). Consequently, as Dover states, 
the EU needed to have access to NATO assets to resolve this conflict, because the EU has not 
been able to deal with the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty  demonstrated  certain  ‘provisions’.  It  has  further  expanded  these  tasks  to  increase 
militarisation  with  “Joint  disarmament  operations,  military  advice  and assistance  tasks  and  
post-conflict stabilisation tasks” (The Petersberg Tasks, 2014). All these tasks may contribute to 
the fight  against  terrorism as  well  to  support  third countries  in combating terrorism in their 
territories as Clonan argues. 
According to Verola, the Union should be able to use both civil and military tools to accomplish 
security and defence priorities (Verola in Bindi, 2010). In line with Clonan, this would allow the 
EU  to  implement  efficient  actions,  which  would  be  independent  of  NATO  or  the  US. 
Strategically, once deployed, such operations would allow the EU to “[...] legitimately extend its  
sphere  of  influence  globally  –  independent  of  US  or  the  competing  influences  of  other  
international actors such as China or Russia” (Clonan, 2008: 3). Nevertheless, according to the 
EPLO, through the Berlin  Plus  agreements  of  2003,  the  EU can draw on some of  NATO’s 
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military  capabilities  for  its  own  peacekeeping  operations.  This  possibility  highlights  the 
persistence of dependency of the EU with regard to NATO. In addition, Bretherton and Vogler 
add that collective defence of the territory continues to be covered under the Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which enhances that the EU is still linked to NATO and cannot be self-
sufficient (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).
 
With reference to the other institutional framework changes, the Treaty of Lisbon reforms the old 
EU structure by abolishing the distinction between the three pillars. Previously, the CFSP was a 
part  of  the  second pillar  and was governed by intergovernmental  cooperation,  within  which 
decisions were principally taken unanimously by the Council or the European Council (Verola in 
Bindi,  2010).  However,  the  main  roles  of  the  latter  are  maintained,  as  is  the  principle  of 
unanimity. This would consequently mean to enhance the unity and the consistency of the EU in 
relation to its peacekeeping mission. 
In addition,  Dover underlines that with the Treaty,  the member states “should make military  
assets  available  for  common EU activities  and  support  the  work  of  the  European  Defence  
Agency [EDA]” (Dover in Cini and Borragán, 2013: 250). The EDA has to make the budget 
defence of member states and the development of military capabilities ‘coherent’ in order to 
“[...]  avoid  unnecessary  duplication  of  defence  spend or  defence  research and development  
effort across each state” (Clonan, 2008: 3). In terms of military power, Michael O’Hanlon argues 
that the strengthening of capability to react in conflict situation is vital. He claims that the EU 
made  attempts  to  deploy rapid  force  of  60.000 troops  with  the  Headline  Goals.  One  could 
therefore argue that the EU may hold the capability to use military instruments, because of the 
rapid deployable troops. This leads to the question of capability-expectation-gap, and if the EU is 
‘minimising’/ ‘closing’ the gap that Christopher Hill presented in the 1990s.  
From the above-mentioned analysis on the Treaty of Lisbon, it is argued that the framework of 
the foreign and defence cooperation resulted in a process that existed even before the Lisbon 
Treaty. From 1992 to 2003, the Petersberg Tasks, the Headline Goals and the European Security 
Strategy were developed, hence remarking what the EU initiated before the implementation of 
the  Lisbon  Treaty.  However,  the  EU  demonstrated  certain  provisions  within  the  area  of 
peacekeeping,  by strengthening its  capabilities with the Treaty of Lisbon. We argue that  the 
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Treaty seeks to enhance the role of the European Union as an international level by expanding its 
military  power  usage.  As  an  end  note,  it  is  very  important  to  understand  that  a  theoretical  
strengthening of capabilities does not equal a change in application of force.
Peacekeeping
The peacekeeping direction of EU foreign affairs is clearly visible in the early Petersberg Tasks; 
“humanitarian  and rescue  tasks;  peacekeeping  tasks; [and]  tasks  of  combat  forces  in  crisis  
management, including peacemaking” (The Petersberg Tasks, 2014). The same is evident in the 
revision of the tasks in the Lisbon Treaty which added “Joint disarmament operations; military  
advice  and  assistance  tasks;[and]  post-conflict  stabilisation  task”  and  further  expanded  the 
second point of the first task with the addition “conflict prevention” (ibid.).
It is evident in this revision that the EU demonstrates a “[...] willingness to use force in support  
of crisis management operations” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:213). 
Furthermore, it is also in points such as joint disarmament and military assistance and the nature 
of such a task, that the EU is more willing and through the treaty, capable of inserting armed 
military personnel in potentially more violent conflicts than before. The conflict prevention could 
allow the EU to discuss and prepare for a conflict that has the potential to erupt, whereas before 
the EU could not begin to arm forces legally before a conflict had become one. This could be 
critically important as according to O’Hanlon, a standard rapid reaction force takes two to three 
months to deploy, which in a typical war scenario would often equal thousands of lives lost 
(O’Hanlon in Crocker et al. 2013). This again shows a commitment to peacekeeping written into 
the very legal  authority of the EU. A problem in this  regard though is  stated by the EPLO 
briefing paper of 2012 is that the power of the EU external action service is still limited in areas 
on humanitarian aid and development (EPLO, 2012:1). This essentially means that although the 
EEAS can intercede in a conflict,  the European commission can in  the worst  case scenario; 
decide to abandon a post-conflict country despite of a humanitarian catastrophe (ibid.). Although, 
peacebuilding  is  not  a  focus  in  the  analysis  the  implications  on  peacekeeping  and  conflict 
management are severe. Furthermore, this problem is further worsened by the EPLO paper’s 
statement that there might be some power-struggle within the EU; “doubts remain [about inter-
institutional co-operation] and not least because of evidence of internal power struggles” (ibid.). 
These power-struggles  do make the quite  fragmented responsibility and interest  areas  of  the 
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different EU institutions a hindrance for peacekeeping, however as the paper also states this 
problem can be solved by inter-institutional cooperation within the structure of the EU (ibid.).
In the above-mentioned analysis on EU’s peacekeeping operations, we argue that the revision of 
the Petersberg Tasks, implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon, demonstrates that EU has shown its 
willingness  to  use force in  a  peacekeeping context,  and has  strengthened its  military power 
accordingly. This indicates that EU - through the Treaty, has become more capable of employing 
armed military personnel in conflict settings.
Global actor
This section seeks to examine the role of the EU as a global actor by going beyond the notion of  
‘global  actorness’,  followed by a  discussion  on what  makes  the  EU a global  actor.  A short 
summary of  the  five  sources  placed  under  the  category “global  actor”  by Christopher  Hill, 
Bretherton and Vogler, official documents from the European Commission, and the European 
Council, EPLO, and GCSP will be presented. 
As the former High Representative of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Javier Solana, 
stated in 2005, “Both our citizens and our international partners want and expect a stronger  
European  presence  on  the  international  stage”  (Solana,  2005:1).   Here,  he  stresses  on  the 
importance of delivering a pro-active, coherent and effective foreign policy. Solana emphasises 
on the foreign and defence policy, as a measure of power and responsibilities that the Member 
States, represents. Solana stresses on how EU improved its military capabilities by the EU Rapid 
Reaction Force. The aim of enforcing the European Defence Agency was to “[…] increase the  
amount of usable military capabilities European Governments have at their disposal” (ibid.:2). 
This, implicates that the focus at that time, was on security, where Solana further argues that the 
civilian-military cooperation that one could call increase of military capabilities, are measures 
that “[…] should enable the Union to increase its crisis management capabilities so that it can  
successfully  address  the  complex,  multi-faceted  security  crisis  of  the  21st century”  (ibid.). 
Drawing lines to Dacian Duna, one could argue that EU has to respond, act and react as a global 
security actor. Despite the fact that the EU has not yet realising “its full potential”, Solana argues 
that the EU has delivered “[…] successful example of building peace through integration; and  
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through what it does – by promoting global security” (ibid.:3). Security and peace, as stated by 
Solana, are core contributions that the EU has remarked, and what EU aims at achieving.
Christopher Hill, in the 1990s, presented the notion of ‘capability-expectation-gap’, stressing on 
the importance of ‘defining’ the European Community in an international relation context; to 
understand  how  EU  operates.  According  to  Hill,  defence  and  actorness  are  two  separate 
categories that depend on each other – the main idea here is that building an effective military 
capacity highly depends on achieving “general” actorness. It can therefore be argued that the 
actorness  is  a  determinant  for  the  development  of  an  effective  military  capacity.  Utilising 
Sjöstedt,  an  international  actor  are  likely  to  be  an  entity  that  is  “delimited  from  others”, 
autonomous, in the sense that it makes own laws and decisions that possesses certain structural 
prerequisites for action on the international level, meaning ‘legal personality’ (Sjöstedt 1977, in 
Hill, 1993: 309). 
The EPLO report seeks to discuss the effect the Lisbon Treaty has had on the Common Foreign 
and  Security  Policy,  in  which  it  implies  that  “[…]  the  European  Union  acquired  legal  
personality” (EPLO, 2012:2). In this matter, the EPLO argues that the Lisbon Treaty reinforced 
its ‘foreign policy identity’ “[…] as it allows the EU to, for instance, be party to international  
agreements  and  allows  the  EU  member  states  to  speak  with  one  voice  in  international  
organizations” (ibid.). 
Following Bretherton and Vogler, according to them recognition of an actor is provided by the 
Public International Law, which developed a formal concept of ‘legal personality’: “The legal  
actorness, confers a right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to  
incur obligations” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 14).  The legal status does not necessarily mean 
that there is a bond between legal status and actorness, exemplified by the notion that EU can 
achieve important functions without having legal personality (ibid.:15).  This means that even 
before  the  Lisbon Treaty,  which  gave  the  EU a legal  personality,  the  EU already possessed 
actorness. It is interesting to discuss whether the Lisbon Treaty - by its implementation of a legal  
personality,  enhanced EU’s  actorness.  The core  idea  of  the  legal  personality is  that  the  law 
provides an institutional context in which the actor can ‘operate’ and act on the basis of when it 
is appropriate to act or not. From this, one could argue that by establishing a legal personality, it 
recognises an actor’s ability to ‘act’, which Bretherton and Vogler also implies: “Nonetheless, the  
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law  continues  to  have  significance  in  so  far  as  it  provides  an  institutional  context  which  
contributes  to  shared  understandings  concerning  who  may  act  and  the  appropriateness  (or  
otherwise)  of  actor’s  behaviour”  (ibid.).  For  example,  the  EU  is  henceforth  capable  of 
concluding international agreements and joining international organisations most importantly the 
UN General Assembly and international and conventions. EU’s ‘presence’ in the international 
affairs is another crucial aspect, which Hill,  Bretherton and Vogler, stresses on. According to 
Bretherton and Vogler, the capability plays a crucial role in evaluating EU’s actorness and its 
presence. They argue that capability refers to the internal context of EU action, which enables 
“[…] external action and hence govern the Union’s ability to capitalize on presence or respond  
to opportunity” (ibid.: 29). 
 
A European  Security  Strategy  report  from  2014,  A Global  Actor  in  Search  of  a  Strategy, 
published by the European Commission, highlights the foreign policy as an actor separately from 
its Member States, and questioning whether the foreign policy actor is an actor distinct from the 
Member States. In order to define EU as a global actor, it is vital to stress upon the Union’s 
foreign policy, defining foreign policy as  “[…] directed at the external environment with the  
objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to  
pursue interests, values and goals” (European Commission, 2014:21). One could argue that the 
foreign policy means influence, or specifically the ability to influence other actors, to fulfil the 
desired outcome. As Bretherton and Vogler also imply, presence indicates the actual ability to 
influence on an external level, thus meaning the ability to shape perceptions, expectations and 
behaviour  (Bretherton  and  Vogler,  2006).  It  can  therefore  be  argued,  that  presence  presents 
actions of the EU, and the influence EU may or may not have.
 
As the seminar, initiated by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy argues, published in 2003, the 
EU can be viewed as a global or regional actor, depending on its ability to create security (GCSP, 
2003).  According  to  GCSP,  the  EU’s  regional  or  global  role  and  hence  actorness,  is  being 
discussed in relation to EU in peace operations. As stated by the former High Representative, 
Javier Solana in the EU summits, before 2003: “[…] the EU will play a role on the international  
scene” (ibid.:14).
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In 2003 the European Union initiated a European Security Strategy (ESS),  called ‘A Secure 
Europe in a Better World’, which initially states that, “No single country is able to tackle today’s  
complex problems on its own” (ESS, 2003:1). EU is, according to Javier Solana, facing crucial 
security challenges, arguing that; “[…] the European Union is inevitably a global player” (ibid.). 
From  this  it  can  be  argued  that  the  EU  is  expected  to  perform  as  a  global  actor  in  the 
international  scene.  As  Christopher  Hill  argues,  expectations  are  crucial  to  how  the  entity 
performs. Hill claims that when lowering ones’ expectations one is lowering one’s ambitions.
As stated in the ESS the EU is facing core challenges within the realm of security: Proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crimes (ibid.:5). 
This  report  raises  a  fundamental  question  on  whether  the  narrow  focus  on  security  has 
strengthened EU’s potential to be presented as a global security actor. As stated in the strategy, 
the new threats that has been more visible since 2003, are not “purely military” and cannot “[…] 
be  tackled  by purely  military means”,  but  “each  [threat] requires  a mixture of  instruments” 
(ibid.:7).  The military aspect is  being implied in the report,  and may therefore empower the 
notion that EU is being more focused on its military capabilities, hence representing a global 
security actor, as Dacian Duna also states. According to him, the strategy report is an attempt to 
create an awareness of the EU’s global role. Duna refers to the European Commission that states: 
”The Union must  increase its  influence in world affairs,  promote values  such as peace and  
security,  democracy  and  human rights,  provide  aid  for  the  least  developed  countries  […]” 
(European Commission in Duna,  2010:3).  Collective agreement – attaining consensus – is  a 
prerequisite to deliver the goals, aiming to spread EU values, which indicates EU’s normative 
power.  It  further  stresses  upon  the  notion  that  external  actors  expect  the  EU  to  take 
responsibility: “Europe’s partners expect it to carry out fully its responsibilities” (ibid.).  This 
goes in line with the GCPS seminar that presents the idea of a global actor is a matter of “ […] 
demonstrating it than with stating it, the EU will soon have to demonstrate that it is actually a  
global actor in the security field” (GCPS, 2003:15). From this it can be argued that the EU is 
highly expected to be and act in the area of security, and is expected to “do something” as stated 
in the report.  According to the EPLO Briefing Paper the EU and the UN have an important 
cooperation in crisis management since 2003. Indeed, the EU is even the “[...] one of the major  
contributors  to  UN  peacekeeping  operations,  both  financially  and  with  personnel  on  the  
ground”  (EPLO,  2012:  11).  The  GCPS  seminar  followed  by  the  ESS  from  2003  shows 
22
indications of EU acting on a global level. According to the GCPS report, acting “[…] a little  
everywhere may be the sign of a global vocation but not necessarily the sign of a major role” 
(GCPS, 2003:15). This may lead to the question of what is meant by ‘major role’, and what 
would make the EU to having a major role. 
The main argument of the above-mentioned analysis on global actorness, is embedded in the 
notion that in order to act as a global actor, it is vital to be capable of acting in the security area -  
as a security actor. As the European Security Strategy from 2003 implies, the new threats should 
according to the EU be tackled by means of a combination of instruments; civilian and military, 
which emphasised a sharpened focus on security. The EU acquired a legal personality with the 
Lisbon Treaty, but as Bretherton and Vogler argue the actorness has not been determined by the 
legal personality. This means that the EU was already able to achieve important functions. This 
leads to the crucial question if the Lisbon Treaty by its implementation of the legal personality, 
made the role of the EU as an actor  more ‘visible’ on the world stage.  Furthermore,  in  the 
gaining of a legal personality although Bretherton and Vogler do state that a legal personality 
does not make one a global actor or the other way around, the EU has by its legal personality 
been strengthened in its role as a global actor, especially in regards to its use of normative power.
CONCLUSION
The conclusive remark of this project rests on the notion that EU’s power,  taken shape as a 
normative power, may be decreasing as a result of the process of militarisation that the EU has 
set up rapid deployment forces with the Headline Goal and the expansion of the Petersberg tasks 
with  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  In  order  to  understand  the  EU’s  role  in  international  conflict 
management, it has been necessary to examine its role, as an actor operating and acting in the 
international  setting.  The  focus  on  security  in  the  international  community  has  increased 
especially reflected in the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. The role of the EU, 
presented as a global actor highly depends on its capabilities; both military and civilian, which 
should be tackled by a mixture of these instruments. The main argument revolves around the 
notion  that  the Lisbon Treaty was an outcome of  a  ‘pressure’ of  expectations  posed by the 
international community. In this the EU acquired a Legal personality that in turn strengthened its 
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positions in the international system and by increasing its legitimacy, allowed it further actorness 
as a global actor. The two; the global actorness and the legal personality, should not be seen as 
fully comparable aspects however in this case they can complement/reinforce each other, and 
further compliment the normative power of the EU. This furthermore, raised the question of how 
the EU changed its application of force in theory, and not necessarily in practise. This would 
mean that even though the EU has strengthened its military capabilities, since it has kept its 
peacekeeping goals for foreign policy it has not necessarily decreased its normative power.
Again, asking how the Lisbon Treaty changed the way the EU is able to apply force; our answer 
would rest on the notion that the Lisbon Treaty has changed the EU’s ability to apply force from 
a more civilian actor to a more military actor. This however has not changed the overall goal of 
the peacekeeping aim of the EU foreign policy. Although the Lisbon Treaty is a visible change, it  
cannot stand alone since the process from civilian actor to a more military actor has been over 
several decades, indeed the Lisbon Treaty is only one step of this movement towards the EU 
closing the capability-expectation gap and expanding its role as a global actor. 
DISCUSSION/ AFTERTHOUGHTS
One could argue that the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as an attempt to make EU 
more efficient in its way and whether this has made the EU finally reach the aim of being a 
global actor. One could in this regard question whether a global actor needs a specific niche of 
operation, and whether the EU can share its peacekeeping goals with the UN but still be a global 
actor.  Further  one could  ask if  the  EU through its  cooperation  with NATO is  delimiting its 
capabilities by not being self sufficient and whether this again limits the EU’s actorness on a 
global scale. Is the foreign policy of the European Union determining whether the Union can be 
perceived as an international or global actor? The notion of global actorness, has presented for us 
the idea that EU is expected to act as security actor, not only regionally but also globally, in order 
to call itself a ‘global’ actor. The crucial question remains: if the EU has to ‘do a little more’ to  
strengthen its actorness and to promote itself as a global actor, and furthermore implicates the 
question of what this ‘little more’ is.
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Last we would like to make a discussion on the definition of military power, defined as hard 
power; as shown in the project the EU has sharpened its military capabilities in order to pursue 
peacekeeping objective, however although it is agreed that military power is defined as hard 
power, we question whether peacekeeping missions using military power, has to be defined as 
being military actorness. As quoted during the project, a civil actor can be seen as an actor that 
does foreign policy through and for the international system to reinforce it. This again raises the 
question of whether a civil actor cannot pursue civil goals through military action. We argue that 
this  is  to a  large extent  what  the EU does;  using hard power for soft  power goals,  and we 
question whether this means that the EU should be seen as a hard-power actor. 
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